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Abstract
In Europe, gas market mergers aim at reducing restrictions on gas wholesale mar-
kets. Market mergers also allow network users to book transport capacity at different 
gas transmission system operators (TSOs), which may give rise to inter-TSO com-
petition. Our theoretical analysis reveals the incentive for TSOs, operating under a 
revenue-cap regulation in merged markets, to charge lower tariffs at borders where 
different TSOs offer capacity, compared to borders where only one TSO offers 
capacity. This incentive does not directly result from revenue-cap regulation but is 
due to efficiency benchmarking. We test this hypothesis by applying a panel data 
analysis to tariffs charged at German border points between 2015 and 2018. In line 
with our hypothesis, we find lower tariffs at those border points where network users 
have a choice between different TSOs. An additional sensitivity analysis differenti-
ating between transit and meshed networks confirms this result. We conclude that 
German TSOs, operating in merged markets and under a revenue-cap regime with 
efficiency benchmarking, compete for demand at borders at which different TSOs 
offer capacity.
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1 Introduction
According to economic theory, the absence of effective competition requires regu-
lation of natural monopolies. Such monopolists are often infrastructure operators. 
In gas markets, transmission and distribution networks are natural monopolies, and 
hence they are regulated. Transmissions networks, operated by transmissions sys-
tem operators (hereafter: TSOs), connect all major players and infrastructures of gas 
markets. Therefore, they are the backbone of gas markets that facilitate wholesale 
markets.1 In Europe, there are gas market areas organised as so-called entry-exit sys-
tems, which also allows for cross-border trade. To reduce barriers to trade, and to 
increase wholesale market liquidity and competition, several European gas markets 
have already merged with more mergers to be expected. Market mergers facilitate 
market integration. Barriers, like tariffs, between markets disappear, so that single 
markets are joined to become one market, resulting in a single price on the whole-
sale market for gas (ACER and CEER 2015).
Besides the impact on wholesale markets, market mergers can also have an 
impact on the behaviour of gas TSOs. If, after a merger of market areas, two TSOs 
operating in the same market area are both connected to another adjacent mar-
ket area, network users obtain transport alternatives; network users must choose 
between different TSOs (Keller et al. 2019). Thus, market mergers may imply inter-
TSO competition. However, such a competition may only be possible if the demand 
side makes its choices efficiently. Keller et al. (2019) analysed the efficiency of net-
work users’ booking capacity and found their booking behaviour is sensitive to dif-
ferences tariffs.
Price-sensitive booking behaviour is a prerequisite for inter-TSO competition. 
However, it is not a sufficient condition for inter-TSO competition. Since TSOs are 
regulated entities, the possibilities, and the incentives to engage in tariff competi-
tion, are determined by the regulatory regime applied. Therefore, it is necessary to 
analyse how TSOs in merged market areas set tariffs assuming efficient booking 
behaviour on the demand side, and considering the regulatory regime applied.
The literature describes several regulatory regimes applied to energy networks, 
which differ in the incentive power, and the level of profits allowed (Arcos-Vargas 
et al. 2017). Armstrong and Sappington (2006) examine how to introduce compe-
tition in regulated industries and find that an optimal liberalisation process highly 
depends on the institutional setting. In the case of the liberalisation of the British gas 
market, they show that allowing for competition in regulated industries often refers 
to activities such as production and supply of utilities, and not directly to infrastruc-
ture competition. Vogelsang (2002) assesses the competitive role of price-cap regu-
lation and horizontal competition and concludes that price-caps allow for regulation 
cum competition given the flexibility they offer in setting prices for regulated output 
of a firm. However, the presence of (potential) competitors is required to introduce 
competition to a monopolist, which requires a contestable market and free market 
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entry (Baumol 1982). Cave (2004, 2014) examines potential competition between an 
integrated incumbent owning telecommunication networks and new entrants. Laf-
font and Tirole (1996) claim a duplication of a network, noting that this is associ-
ated with high costs, may be justified as it may allow for competition. Studies and 
research intending to contribute explicitly to the future of tariff regulation in Euro-
pean gas markets do not take into account the role of market mergers with regard 
to the potential for inter-TSO competition on tariffs (Cervigni et al. 2019; EY and 
REKK 2018; Hecking 2015).
Our paper extends the literature on (de-)regulation of natural monopolists. Our 
focus is on the impact of market mergers on inter-TSO competition on tariffs. We 
contribute to the future of tariff regulation in European gas markets, but unlike other 
work the potential competition arises from merging markets with regulated monopo-
lists and does not arise from unregulated new entrants into market.
This paper investigates tariff related incentives for TSOs that are regulated by a 
revenue-cap regime, which is the most common regulatory regime applied in Euro-
pean gas markets. In that case, TSOs may face competition because of market merg-
ers. The first step in the investigation is the theoretical analysis of incentives for 
TSOs setting their tariffs considering market mergers. Next, it explores empirically 
whether regulated TSOs in Germany, who operate under a revenue-cap regulation 
and have experienced several market mergers, consider the presence of other TSOs 
in setting their tariffs.
According to theory, TSOs operating under revenue-cap regulation have an 
incentive to change tariffs to maximise profits. However, the incentive is not based 
on capping the maximum revenues but is due to efficiency benchmarking. The result 
of efficiency benchmarking, i.e. the efficiency score, is influenced by a TSO’s level 
of capacity bookings.2 As the efficiency score is considered by the regulator deter-
mining the allowed revenues, ultimately the level of capacity bookings impacts the 
TSO’s revenues and profits. To obtain higher capacity bookings, a TSO has the 
incentive to charge lower tariffs. In an unmerged market, TSOs compete by reduc-
ing their costs per unit of output compared to their peer group. In a merged mar-
ket, TSOs have an additional incentive as they also compete directly for the same 
demand at borders where more than one TSO offers capacity. Therefore, we expect 
lower tariffs at network points at borders where different TSOs offer capacity com-
pared to borders where only one TSO offers capacity.
We test this hypothesis by applying a panel data analysis to tariffs charged 
between 2015 and 2018 at German border points by German TSOs that oper-
ate under a revenue-cap regulation with efficiency benchmarking. In line with our 
hypothesis, we find that the tariffs are up to 52% lower in case more than one TSO 
offers capacity at a border. An additional sensitivity analysis shows that this result is 
robust to a differentiation between transit and meshed networks. Hence, we conclude 
that German TSOs, operating in merged markets, and under a revenue-cap regime 
with efficiency benchmarking, have an incentive to reduce tariffs at competitive 
2 The efficiency score is derived from a benchmark analysis, which compares a ratio of TSO’s output 
(i.e. capacity bookings) with input (costs) within a peer group.
144 J. T. Keller et al.
1 3
network points, where they compete for demand. Our empirical analysis confirms 
TSO act accordingly.
Following this introduction, the paper describes in Sect.  2 how European gas 
markets are designed, how transmission networks are commercially operated, and 
how market mergers affect gas markets and market players and ends with describing 
the principles of tariff regulation. Section  3 continues with the theoretical frame-
work analysing tariff related incentives for TSOs under a revenue-cap regulation 
also considering market mergers. In Sect.  4, we present our empirical model, the 
data used to test our hypothesis, and the results obtained. Section 5 concludes with 
summarising the main results and discussing the implications for further research 
and regulation.
2  Background
2.1  TSOs, network points, and market mergers
A TSO offers transmission services using a gas pipeline network. Transmission in 
this context refers to the transport of gas through a mainly high-pressure infrastruc-
ture that is not aimed at a direct local distribution, and does not include other activi-
ties, like production and storage, than gas transport. A TSO offers the use of the 
network by offering transport capacity to the market. Such capacity is demanded by 
so-called network users being, for example gas traders or suppliers (European Par-
liament and Council of the European Union 2009a).
Capacity that is offered at network points can be referred to as the right of a net-
work user to inject or withdraw gas. Injection and withdrawal of gas within a TSO’s 
network are independent from each other. The so-called entry-exit system allows a 
network user to inject (entry) gas at any point of the network, and to withdraw (exit) 
gas at any other point of the same network. The transport is the sole responsibility 
of the network operator. A TSO network, therefore, may also be referred to as an 
entry-exit system or a market area. As entry capacity and exit capacity are independ-
ent from each other, there are no predefined routes for gas transport within a market 
area. This is also reflected in tariffs charged for capacity bookings. For example, the 
same tariff is charged for capacity available at a certain exit point, regardless of the 
geographical distance from the corresponding entry point.3 Therefore, tariffs may 
be deemed not to fully reflect costs. Gas injected into a TSO network may also be 
withdrawn virtually. Virtual injection and withdrawal mean that gas that is traded at 
wholesale markets stays in the pipelines, however the ownership of the commodity 
changes. As for tariffs this means that if gas is purchased at the wholesale market, 
and withdrawn at a physical network point, it is not known into which network point 
3 Nevertheless, some TSOs in practice determine tariffs considering geographical distance. This is done, 
for example, by using the so-called capacity-weighted distance approach (European Commission 2017b). 
However, distance is only considered in determining the tariff applicable at a certain network point with-
out considering the actual distance the gas is flown.
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the gas was originally injected, and hence the physical route of gas is unknown. 
Hence, an entry-exit system allows for trade in wholesale markets but is associated 
with capacity tariffs not fully reflecting costs.
There are two categories of network points: Interconnection points (hereafter: 
IPs) connect two market areas (European Commission 2017a). This means that IPs 
connect the network of two adjacent TSOs in different market areas. In practice, 
these IPs are usually located at the border between countries allowing for cross-bor-
der trades and flows. If a country has more than one market area, IPs also exists 
within a country. All other network points within a country are referred to as domes-
tic points. These include, for instance, production sites, storage facilities, industrial 
customers, and networks for the purpose of local distribution.
The introduction of the entry-exit system allowed gas wholesale markets to 
evolve efficiently (Vazquez et al. 2012). To improve the functioning of these whole-
sale markets, that is increase liquidity and competition among trading companies, 
market areas are merged. As a result of adjacent markets merging, the commercial 
barriers between the formerly separate markets disappear, and their wholesale mar-
kets become one with a single price for gas (ACER and CEER 2015). Such mar-
ket mergers have taken place, for example within France and Germany, and even 
between countries, for example between Belgium and Luxembourg. Future mergers 
are expected not at least because regulatory authorities aim at further improving the 
functioning of wholesale markets (ACER and CEER 2015).4
To flow gas to an adjacent market area, network users need to book capacity at 
IPs located at the border separating the adjacent markets. The tariffs paid for such 
capacity bookings represent transportation costs. As each market area has its own 
wholesale market for gas, it can be expected that without any other restrictions the 
difference between wholesale prices for gas does not exceed the tariffs to be paid for 
transport capacity, i.e. the transportation costs. If these two adjacent markets merge, 
there is no border between them anymore. If the border disappears also the need 
to book capacity connecting the former markets disappears. Obviously, the border 
and the capacity disappear only in a commercial sense, i.e. in terms of gas trad-
ing. As a market merger does not impact the physical networks, the network points 
still exist, and are still needed to allow for physical gas flows between the networks 
via these points. However, as the former markets now belong to the same market 
area, network users no longer must book these capacities. The reason is that also the 
new market area is organised as an entry-exit system, which allows network users to 
inject and withdraw gas independently from each other, and independently from the 
underlying networks and TSOs. As for a merged market, network users may inject 
gas into one TSO’s network, and withdraw it from another TSO’s network, while the 
TSOs are responsible to manage these flows.
Although market mergers are pursued to improve the functioning of gas whole-
sale markets, they also affect the TSOs of the market areas merging. Merging two 
4 One of the next market mergers takes place in Germany. By October 2021, the current market areas 
GASPOOL and NetConnect Germany shall be merged to become Trading Hub Europe. See http://www.
markt gebie tszus ammen legun g.de/en.
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market areas, having one TSO each, usually leads to a new market area having two 
TSOs.5 This creates transport alternatives to network users in case the two TSOs 
have an IP at a border to a third market area (Keller et al. 2019). This is illustrated 
in Fig. 1. Suppose initially there are three market areas, namely MA A, MA B, and 
MA C, each operated by its own TSO, namely TSO A, TSO B, and TSO C. Each 
of these market areas, organised as an entry-exit system, has its own gas wholesale 
market. All three TSOs offer capacity at IPs. TSO A and TSO B also offer capac-
ity at domestic points, whereas TSO C is a transit TSO not having domestic net-
work points.6 Each TSO also has IPs connecting its network, and hence the market 
area’s wholesale market, to the other networks. Now assume the market areas A, B, 
and C merge to become a single market area denoted as MA ABC. As mentioned 
before, a merger means that borders commercially disappear. Referring to the figure, 
this means IPs A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, and C2 are not subject to capacity bookings 
anymore, as all three TSOs now belong to the same market area. Gas, for example 
injected into TSO B’s network may be withdrawn at a domestic point of TSO A 
Fig. 1  Stylised commercial relationship of TSOs, borders of market areas, and network points
5 It is conceivable that TSOs in the new, merged market area belong to the same parent company, which 
may affect their competitive behavior. We assume that this is not the case, and the TSOs are separate 
companies, which is generally the case.
6 Note that the focus is on commercial aspects. Hence, physical pipelines are not relevant because the 
market areas are designed as entry-exit systems, and therefore, omitted in the figure.
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without any additional capacity booking in between, since the commercial border 
between market areas A and B no longer exists. Hence, there are also lower trans-
portation costs. From a network users’ point of view, this is like as if there was only 
one TSO instead of two. Because the commercial borders disappear wholesale mar-
kets are no longer separated, hence by merging the market areas also the wholesale 
markets merge.
As a result of market mergers also another, not directly intended, effect can be 
observed. This refers to potential inter-TSO competition which is the focus of this 
paper. Referring to the example in Fig. 1, MA 2 and MA 3 are each connected to 
two TSOs. Assume that in wholesale market MA ABC prices are significantly lower 
than in wholesale market of MA 3, i.e. the price difference exceeds the transporta-
tion costs. This is a price signal that allows for arbitrage. Since TSO B and TSO C 
are both connected to MA 3, and after the merger both belong to MA ABC, network 
users can choose between capacity of TSO B, and that of TSO C to make use of the 
arbitrage opportunity. Noting that capacity is highly standardised, a network user 
is supposed to choose from the alternatives the one which is associated with least 
costs; this has been demonstrated by Keller et at. (2019). Since this effect results 
from market mergers, market mergers may allow for inter-TSO competition.
Unlike IPs at the borders, where from a network users’ point of view substitutes 
may arise due to a merger, domestic points are usually connected to just one trans-
mission network. Most domestic points refer to end customers. These are character-
ised by a relative inelastic demand; hence, they can be viewed as captive demand. 
For households, gas is usually used for cooking and heating. Once a cooking facility 
or heating system has been installed, the household is locked-in into this technol-
ogy. Although, for example additional insulation and changes in behaviour may lead 
to a lower demand for gas, there are still high switching costs related to a full fuel 
switch. The same applies to industrial customers, who may have a limited ability to 
switch fuels.
2.2  Tariff determination
In general, TSOs are regulated as they are natural monopolists facing no effective 
competition. Regulation of European TSOs mainly consists of network access reg-
ulation and tariff regulation supported by ownership unbundling and transparency 
provisions (European Commission 2017a, b; European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union 2009a, b).
Tariff regulation determines how much a regulated TSO is entitled to earn from 
network charges paid by network users. In principle, determining this maximum, the 
so-called allowed revenues, includes consideration of the costs of realised invest-
ments as well as the costs to operate and maintain the infrastructure. In addition, 
an appropriate return on capital ensures a firm can finance the investments. In the 
literature, there are different regulatory regimes, which are either cost-based (like 
cost-plus and rate-of-return regulation) or incentive-based (like price-cap, revenue-
cap, and yardstick regulation) (Arcos-Vargas et  al. 2017). The differences refer to 
how the allowed revenues are related to the firm’s costs, which leads to different 
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incentives for the regulated firm (see for example Braeutigam and Panzar 1989; 
Cabral and Riordan 1989; Averch and Johnson 1962). Regardless of the regulatory 
regime applied, the regulated TSO is given an allowed revenue cap determining how 
much the firm is entitled to earn.7
After it has been determined how much a TSO is entitled to earn, the second 
aspect of tariff regulation deals with how the TSO obtains the allowed revenues, i.e. 
how the allowed revenues are allocated over the various capacity products offered by 
the TSO. In this respect, the allowed revenue constraint in Eq. (1) is binding.8





 for a specific period, which must not be exceeded by the aggregated 
expected revenues obtained at all network points ( i = 1,… , n ) by forecasted (super-
script f) capacity bookings and the tariffs.9,10 Given an allowed revenue constraint, a 
TSO is supposed to prefer the set of tariffs, i.e. a tariff for all network points, which 
maximises the TSO’s profits. As the regulatory authority regulates the total reve-
nues, TSOs are assumed to be free to choose any set of tariffs provided that the 
allowed revenue constraint is met. This allows TSOs to shift forecasted revenues 
from one network point to another. To illustrate this, assume there are two network 
points with equal capacity bookings and tariffs. Total revenues do not change if 
one tariff is decreased while the other tariff is increased by the same amount. This 
implies that if one tariff increases, at least one other tariff must decrease to comply 
with the allowed revenue constraint. If one tariff decreases, this allows the TSO to 
raise another tariff without violating the constraint. This possibility of revenue shift-
ing between network points allows for flexibility in setting tariffs. Since the capacity 
bookings and revenues in Eq. (1) include both capacities from IPs as well as capaci-
ties from domestic points, revenue shifting may take place not only inside a group of 
network points but also between them.
As the TSO’s allowed revenues are set by a regulatory authority, they are exog-
enously given. Regarding the forecasted capacity bookings, which are used as an 









7 Note that different terms may be used under different regulatory regimes, like allowed revenues, target 
revenues, total revenue cap. Although there may be differences in detail, all of them refer to the fact that 
regulation grants a certain level of revenues to be obtained by the TSO.
8 Although tariffs are determined at a particular point in time for a particular period in the future, tar-
iff calculation is static. To calculate the tariff at some point in time, also the allowed revenues and the 
capacity forecast valid for the same point in time are used. Hence, it is not necessary to consider a time 
dimension, which is therefore dropped for simplicity.
9 Note that tariff calculation takes places prior to the tariff period, i.e. the period in which the tariffs are 
valid. Hence, the value for capacity bookings is always a forecasted one.
10 In practice, TSOs offer different types of capacity products, particularly defined by runtimes. Consid-
ering this would result in another index of capacity bookings referring to the different capacity types, and 
the sum over the products would need to be considered. However, as this is not relevant here, we omit the 
distinction of different capacity products for simplicity, and only refer to capacity bookings.
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authority, based on information provided by the TSO, makes a capacity forecast, 
or prescribes a methodology how the TSO must forecast capacity bookings. In this 
case, the TSO has the incentive to underestimate the capacity demand: if actual 
bookings exceed the forecasted ones; the TSO obtains extra revenues and profits. 
Therefore, the regulatory authority needs to control and/or set clear rules on how to 
forecast bookings. This points at the information asymmetries between the regulator 
and the regulated company; the TSO has a more detailed insight into market reac-
tions than the regulatory authority. Such additional information may be an advan-
tage in negotiating the forecasted capacity bookings to be used in determining tar-
iffs. Such an approach related to forecast bookings is characteristic for a price-cap 
regime (Beesley and Littlechild 1989; Sibley 1989). Secondly, a regulatory authority 
may give freedom to the TSO forecasting capacity bookings. Since there is no inter-
action between the regulatory authority and the TSO required, it also overcomes the 
problem of information asymmetry. Such an approach is characteristic of a revenue-
cap regime, which is the focus of this paper (Arcos-Vargas et al. 2017).11
Revenue-cap regulation has been applied in many US states to regulate electricity 
distribution companies with the aim of energy savings (Vogelsang and Cave 2019). 
Whereas a regulated firm under a price-cap regulation has the incentive to increase 
sales in order to minimise average costs, such an incentive does not exist under a 
revenue-cap regime, as it decouples the firm’s revenues from its sales (Stoft 1995; 
Brennan 2010). In European energy markets, utilities are unbundled with energy net-
works being exposed to a regulation. Production, trading, and supply of energy are 
taken place in a competitive environment. Revenue-cap regulation, as applied in the 
European Union’s gas markets, aims at shielding TSOs against volume related risks 
(CEER 2019; Economic Consulting Associates 2018). Gas consumption, for exam-
ple, significantly depends on temperature. If the winter season is colder (warmer) 
than expected, the TSO will ceteris paribus end up with an over-recovery (under-
recovery) due to a higher (lower) demand for transport capacity, derived from a 
higher (lower) demand for the commodity gas, Since demand is highly dependent 
on factors that cannot be influenced by the regulated TSOs, the regulatory authori-
ties protect the regulated infrastructure operators from such a volume risk. This is 
discussed in more detail in the following Sect. 3.
3  Theoretical framework: tariff related incentives for TSOs 
under revenue‑cap regulation
Assume a TSO operating under a revenue-cap regulation with a binding allowed 
revenue constraint as per Eq.  (1). The revenue-cap gives the TSO the flexibility 
to choose amongst different combinations of tariffs and forecasted bookings, pro-
vided that the forecasted revenues to be obtained do not exceed the allowed revenues 
granted.
11 We discuss revenue-caps in more detail in Sect. 3.
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How would a TSO set its tariffs to maximise its profits? In general, revenue-
cap regulation is associated with incentives to set prices. This has been criticised 
by Crew and Kleindorfer (1996) reflected in the so-called Crew-Kleindorfer effect: 
With revenues being capped, profit maximisation directly refers to cost minimisa-
tion. Since the firm’s marginal costs increase in demanded quantities, the firm has 
the incentive to choose a higher price with a corresponding lower volume. This 
price may even exceed the monopoly price causing inefficiencies.
According to the Crew–Kleindorfer effect, a TSO could have the incentive to 
obtain its allowed revenues by setting high tariffs associated with low volumes to 
minimise costs. TSOs’ costs are mainly related to pipelines investments, and hence 
are sunk. Nevertheless, a TSO may have limited marginal costs, for example for gas 
that is consumed by compressors, which are necessary to enable gas transports. In 
the regulatory practice in Europe, such costs are usually considered by the regu-
latory authority as so-called pass-through costs (Economic Consulting Associates 
2018). Such costs are directly considered as an adjustment to the allowed revenues. 
Hence, even in case a TSO has non-negligible marginal costs, the Crew–Kleindorfer 
effect is not likely to apply.
Due to the allowed revenue constraint as per Eq.  (1), a TSO under a revenue-
cap generally faces a volume risk based on the difference between forecasted capac-
ity bookings and actual bookings. If the actual bookings exceed (are less than) the 
forecasted ones, the TSO receives an over-recovery (under-recovery). As a measure 
to protect the regulated firm against volume risks on the demand side, regulatory 
authorities may introduce a so-called regulatory account (European Commission 
2017b).
The regulatory account tracks over- and under-recoveries after each tariff period 
(t), to be reconciled in future periods.12 The balance of the regulatory account (RA) 
at the end of tariff period t is given by Eq. (2), which shows that it is determined by 
two factors:
Firstly, ΔRt refers to the difference in period t between the allowed revenues ( ̄Rt ), 
and the revenues actually obtained, i.e. the tariff ( Tart ) multiplied by the actually 
demanded capacity bookings ( CBt ). Therefore, this represents the over- or under-
recovery due to the difference of expected and actual quantities. Secondly, ΔRAt−1,t 
refers to the regulatory account’s balance at the end of the previous tariff period 
( RAt−1 ), taking into account the reconciliation during this period (a) and interests 
(1 + i). The parameter a defines how much of an over- or under-recovery is rec-
onciled each tariff period. Hence, a = 1/n, with n standing for the number of tariff 
(2)
RAt = ΔRAt−1,t + ΔRt, with





ΔRt = R̄t − Tart × CBt
12 For clarity, tariff period refers to the period during which a tariff is valid, for example, a calendar 
year. This needs to be distinguished from the regulatory period, which is usually longer, and refers to the 
period during which the general rules for the allowed revenues are set (European Commission 2017b).
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periods it takes to fully reconcile an over- or under-recovery. In general, the longer 
it takes to fully reconcile an over- or under-recovery, ceteris paribus, the lower the 
volatility of tariffs. Thus, the parameter a only affects liquidity. Following this, 
(1 − a)RAt−1 denotes the remaining balance of the regulatory account, which has not 
been reconciled yet. (1 + i) ensures the regulatory account bears interests.
To effectively shield the TSO from volume risk, as intended by the regulation, 
the revenue cap is adjusted each tariff period by a fraction of the regulatory account, 
shown by Eq. (3).13
As it is the intention of the regulatory account to protect the regulated TSO 
against volume risk, its inclusion in determining the allowed revenues makes the 
firm indifferent to the demanded volumes. Ultimately, the TSO will at no risk obtain 
the allowed revenues granted, not more and not less. As the TSO does not bear the 
volume risk, the volume risk is borne by the network users. Only looking at this 
aspect, TSOs have no incentive to set tariffs such that they are cost-reflective or aim 
at allocative efficiency.
However, there is another mechanism by which network utilisation affects incen-
tives to set the tariffs. This mechanism is related to how the level of allowed rev-
enues are determined. In general, the allowed revenues are based on the regulated 
firm’s costs, insofar as they are viewed to be efficient. Movements in efficiency 
are divided into frontier shift and catch-up (Giannakis et  al. 2005). Frontier shift 
describes technological progress and innovation allowing for an increase of produc-
tivity. The frontier represents the maximum productivity feasible by objective stand-
ards. Catch-up measures the firm’s movement towards the frontier. It measures the 
productive efficiency between several firms, also referred to as benchmarking.
In regulating TSOs in Europe, the firm’s efficient costs are determined through 
benchmarking. Benchmarking, in simplified terms, describes a measure of compar-
ing a firm’s output-input ratio (i.e. the productivity), within a peer group (Jamasb 
and Pollitt 2003). Such benchmarking is performed periodically and leads to an 
individual efficiency score for each TSO. Equation (4) highlights that the efficiency 
score (ES) of firm i depends on the firm’s output-input-ratio compared to the same 
ratio calculated for a benchmark j, which may be a single (best practice) firm, or 
an average of the peer group. As for TSOs, the input refers to the firms’ costs. Out-
put refers to the networks’ capacity as well as the utilisation, i.e. capacity bookings 
(Mulder 2012).14
(3)Rt = Rt−1 + aRAt−1.
13 This is a simplified representation to show the impact of the regulatory account on the allowed rev-
enues. Therefore, other elements, for example adjustments according to inflation or efficiency targets are 
not considered.
14 It may be argued the output is not capacity bookings but the actual utilisation. However, in order to 
utilise the network, capacity bookings are necessary which is why these are directly related.
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The efficiency score directly impacts the TSO’s allowed revenues. To illustrate 
this, we for simplicity assume the allowed revenues ( R̄ ) of a regulatory period 
(rp) depend only on the firm’s total expenditures (TOTEX), and on its efficiency 
score (ES). Then, R̄rp = TOTEXrp−1 × ESrp−1 . Taking account of this relationship 
the TSO has an incentive to increase its efficiency. Noting that marginal costs are 
negligible, this implies that the regulated firm may want to set the tariffs such that 
it increases the utilisation of the network, and hence the firms efficiency score, to 
obtain higher revenues and profits in the next regulatory period.
A regulatory account shields a TSO operating under a revenue-cap regime 
from volume risk within a regulatory period. However, it does not shield the TSO 
from volume related changes to its efficiency score, which affects the revenues 
in the next regulatory period. For example, assume a TSO is faced with a con-
tinuous decline in demand for its gas transport capacities. If the TSO anticipates 
this decline perfectly by adapting its tariffs, there are no over- or under-recoveries 
tracked on the regulatory account. However, the firm’s efficiency ceteris paribus 
is supposed to decrease if cost, being inputs to the benchmarking, are constant 
while the outputs continuously decline. By objective standards, the TSO ceteris 
paribus becomes less efficient as it diverges from the efficiency frontier.
By way of illustration, assume a peer group of two TSOs. Furthermore, assume 
TSO 1 ceteris paribus faces lower capacity bookings while these are constant for 
TSO 2. If the benchmark is based on the average of both TSOs, or is determined as 
best practice, TSO 1 becomes less productive efficient whereas TSO 2 increases its 
relative efficiency; the efficiency scores change likewise. Since the efficiency score 
affects the allowed revenues ceteris paribus TSO 1 will be granted lower allowed 
revenues, whereas TSO 2 will be granted higher allowed revenues. This example 
highlights that TSOs have an incentive to increase capacity bookings to obtain a 
higher network utilisation. This should be considered in setting tariffs.
Until now, we have elaborated on tariff related incentives for TSOs under reve-
nue-cap regulation without considering market mergers. As highlighted in Sect. 2.1, 
a result of gas market mergers is that different TSOs may offer transport capac-
ity between the same gas market areas. This implies that network users requesting 
transport capacity have a choice between different TSOs offering transport capacity 
at a particular border. Take again the example assuming a market merger has taken 
place. Furthermore, assume both TSO 1 and TSO 2 offer capacity at the same bor-
der. While before the merger, TSO 1 and TSO 2 competed only in the sense that both 
belong to the same peer group, after the merger they directly compete for the same 
demand. Assuming total demand is constant, each TSO has the incentive to charge 
lower tariffs such that it can attract demand served by the other TSO. Hence, the two 
TSOs directly compete for the same demand which gives an additional incentive to 
set lower tariffs to obtain higher capacity bookings, and a higher network utilisation.
We conclude that TSOs operating under a revenue-cap regime have tariff 
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revenues but results from an efficiency benchmarking. Thus, TSOs have incen-
tives to reduce their costs per unit of output as well as to set tariffs such that the 
firm obtains higher capacity bookings; both increase efficiency which increases 
allowed revenues and profits. This holds regardless of whether a market merger 
has taken place. However, in a merged market where TSOs now directly compete 
for the same demand at the borders, competition is supposed to be even stronger. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus we expect lower tariffs at borders at which different 
TSOs offer transport capacity compared to those borders at which only one TSO 
offers transport capacity.
4  Empirical analysis
4.1  Empirical model
Our hypothesis about the impact of market mergers, resulting in choices for network 
users, on TSOs’ tariffs is tested by a panel data analysis. Tariffs are set periodically 
by TSOs. Therefore, panels may be created using TSOs represented by k = 1,… ,m 
that set tariffs for a tariff period t for an IP located at a border i = 1,… , n . For each 
t, this results in a m × n matrix. As Fig. 1 highlights, not every TSO has an IP at 
every border. Therefore, data are not available for every TSO at every border, which 
is why such a panel is highly unbalanced. To overcome this in our model the cross-
section dimension is the border i of gas market areas and not individual TSOs. In 
constructing our panels, we consider the flow directions and differences in gas quali-
ties.15 This is supposed to make the panels more balanced as there are tariffs availa-
ble at every border. More information about the actual panel is presented in Sect. 4.2
If more than one TSO is offering capacity at a border there are different tariffs 
applicable at that border at the same time. Therefore, tariffs observed cannot be used 
as the independent variable if the cross-section refers to borders. To be able to ana-
lyse whether certain explanatory variables lead to higher or lower tariffs we estimate 
the same empirical model choosing both the minimum tariff and the maximum tariff 
as the dependent variable. To control for outliers, we also estimate the model using 
the median tariff of a border as a dependent variable.
Our null hypothesis is that tariff levels are affected by the network users’ possibil-
ity to choose amongst alternative TSOs. Therefore, we include a dummy variable dS 
denoting whether substitutes, i.e. capacity is offered by different TSOs, are available 
to networks users, with dSi,t = 1 if the number of TSOs offering capacity at a border 
i in t exceeds 1, and 0 otherwise.
Complying with the allowed revenue constraint TSOs may shift revenues to be 
obtained between IPs and points with captive demand. Hence, it allows for avoid-
ing competition. This is taken account of by the dummy variable dCDi,t = 1 if the 
15 Depending on the source, the calorific value of gas varies. In general, a high calorific gas (H-gas) and 
a low calorific gas (L-gas) are distinguished (Ströbele et al. 2012). This distinction may also be made in 
transmission capacities. This is distinction is made, for example, in Germany.
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number of TSOs offering capacity at a border i in t and having captive demand 
exceeds 0, and 0 otherwise.
To control for congestions, i.e. a scarcity of capacity, a dummy variable dCoi,t is 
included in the model. It is defined as dCo = 1 if the number of congested IPs at bor-
der i in t exceeds 0, and 0 otherwise.
As the tariffs are set by regulated firms, the allowed revenue constraint is binding 
in setting tariffs. Thus, the model needs to consider capacity bookings and allowed 
revenues. This constraint is binding to every TSO individually. However, the 
dependent variable is a specific tariff observed at a border. To reflect this, the model 
takes into account the average of allowed revenues of all TSOs k = 1,… ,m at bor-





 . For the same reason we include the average of capacity book-






As tariff setting takes place prior to the tariff period for which tariffs are set, and 
tariffs may not be changed during a tariff period, some of the variables used in the 
model are forecasts made by the TSOs. Changes in the market structure and to the 
networks do not happen on short notice. Therefore, TSOs are supposed to know how 
many TSOs operate how many IPs in the upcoming tariff period and whether net-
work users have a possibility of substitution. The same holds irrespective whether 
TSOs have captive demand or not, which is publicly available information. Hence, 
no forecasts are necessary concerning these two variables. In terms of congestion, 
this is different. A TSO cannot know with certainty prior to the tariff period whether 
an IP will be congested. Therefore, the TSO must predict this. The same holds for 
the capacity bookings. A TSO may already have contracts concluded before the tar-
iff period. However, additional capacity bookings may be obtained during the tariff 
period. Forecasted capacity bookings at other TSOs are also unknown and must be 
predicted. Thus, the average capacity booking level per TSO is also a forecasted 
value. In contrast, a TSO knows the own allowed revenues applicable for the upcom-
ing tariff period at the point in time the tariffs are set. On the other hand, a TSO is 
not aware of the allowed revenues of the other TSOs at the point in time the tariffs 
are set. Therefore, the average allowed revenues per TSO is also a forecasted value.
As the aim is to assess elasticities measuring relative changes, we use log–log 
models. In case a variable is a forecasted one, this is highlighted by a superscript f. 
As the models are estimated by fixed effects, a variable covering period fixed effects 
( t ), such as general changes in costs of capital or in inflation, and one variable 
covering cross-section fixed effects ( i ) representing unobserved heterogeneity are 
included. The model is given by Eq. (5).
whereby the selected sample s = minimum, maximum, and median tariffs.
The expectations for the coefficients estimated are determined by the regula-
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a revenue-cap regime with benchmarking we expect for each sample s, in line with 
our theoretical analysis, 𝛽1 < 0 and 𝛽2 < 0 . In case one TSO faces other TSOs offer-
ing capacity at the same border ( dSi,t = 1) we ceteris paribus expect tariffs at this 
border to be lower as compared to borders where a single TSO offers capacity. In 
case the TSOs have captive demand, the firms can more effectively shift revenues to 
be obtained to points with rather inelastic demand for capacity.
TSOs aim at higher capacity bookings. However, in case of scarcity capac-
ity bookings cannot be increased in the short run. Therefore, there is no incentive 
to ceteris paribus apply lower tariffs at congested borders. On the contrary, with a 
binding allowed revenue constraint higher tariffs at congested borders even allow 
for lower tariffs at other borders showing a higher elasticity. Therefore, we expect 
𝛽3 > 0 for each sample s.
According to the allowed revenue constraint tariffs are ceteris paribus supposed 
to be higher if the allowed revenues increase. If capacity bookings increase tariff 
should decrease. Therefore, we expect 𝛽4 > 0 and 𝛽5 < 0 for each sample s. How-
ever, if we would obtain estimates for 4 and 5 that are not significantly different 
from zero, this may point at TSOs shifting revenues towards domestic points.
4.2  Data
After several market mergers in the past, today, Germany has 16 TSOs offering 
transport capacity in two market areas, namely GASPOOL and NetConnect Ger-
many (hereafter: NCG). These TSOs are regulated by revenue-cap regime and 
exposed to an efficiency benchmarking (Economic Consulting Associates 2018). 
Therefore, we test our hypothesis using data for Germany.
Data for IP tariffs are provided by ACER (2019a). This data set contains the cost 
of flowing 1 MWh through an IP on a firm basis in EUR/MWh for all IPs across 
Europe.16 In case different types of firm capacity are offered the tariff refers to the 
best available capacity type. The data set covers the period from 2014 to 2018. 
Besides that, data of the IP’s TSO, the border of connected market areas, and the 
flow direction are available. In line with the empirical model the tariff data are 
grouped by borders distinguishing flow directions and gas qualities. Hence every 
group of data has either entry or exit flow direction and is either H-gas or L-gas. 
After having grouped the data per border the number of active TSOs at a border is 
determined. To estimate the model not only the total number of TSOs operating at 
a border is necessary but also how many of these TSOs have captive demand. This 
information can be obtained directly from the TSOs’ websites.
ACER publishes an annual report on contractual congestion at interconnection 
points (ACER 2019b). The findings of the reports covering the years 2014–2018 are 
16 In general, there are two categories of transmission capacities: Firm capacity grants the right to net-
work users to transport gas without any risk of being interrupted. Interruptible capacity may be inter-
rupted by the TSO, for example, to ensure security of supply (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2009a). In some countries, for example Germany, different types of firm capacity may 
be offered. Their difference refers to potential conditions of firmness or gas routes. For additional infor-
mation see BDEW (2019).
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linked to the IPs of the tariff data set. An IP may either be congested if the IP itself 
is congested, or if the adjacent IP is congested. In the latter case, an IP on the Ger-
man side may have free capacity to offer, however, there is no corresponding capac-
ity available on the other side of the border.
To control for changes in tariffs based on changes in allowed revenues data on 
allowed revenues for 2014–2018 are necessary. Although TSOs operate under wide-
ranging transparency obligations, allowed revenues are not published for the period 
that we analyse. The main driver of the allowed revenues is the so-called regulated 
asset base (hereafter: RAB). Therefore, the RAB may be used as a proxy for the 
allowed revenues. However, also data on RAB are not available. However, TSOs’ 
annual reports show the value of fixed assets. Fixed assets and RAB are based on 
the same items and are supposed to be strongly correlated. The difference solely 
refers to differences in depreciation periods. Therefore, we use the book value of 
fixed assets as a proxy for the RAB to determine the forecasted allowed revenues. 
There are also joint venture pipelines, whose capacity is offered by the shareholder 
TSOs. In such a case, we allocate the value of fixed assets directly to the sharehold-
ers based on the ownership structure.
Data on capacity bookings are collected from the transparency platform oper-
ated by ENTSOG (2019). This transparency platform publishes, among others, data 
on capacity bookings at IPs. Capacity bookings are distinguished between firm and 
interruptible capacity. In determining tariffs interruptible capacity is usually given 
a discount to compensate for the risk of being interrupted. In return this means that 
booking one unit of firm capacity contributes more to revenues than booking one 
unit of interruptible capacity because of the discount. Also, within the group of firm 
capacity bookings there are differences. There are different types of firm capacities 
that may be offered at an IP. These different types may receive a discount due to 
quality differences. Furthermore, a so-called multiplier may be added to capacity 
booking of firm as well as of interruptible capacity with the intention to stimulate 
long-term bookings by making them relatively cheaper compared to short-term 
bookings. Also, seasonal factors may be applied. All these may cause an inaccuracy 
of data. The capacity bookings reported by the transparency platform are aggregated 
bookings of network users. However, the value of one unit of capacity booked may 
be higher or lower, depending on discounts granted and multipliers applied. Such 
information is not available, which needs to be considered analysing the estimates of 
the empirical model.
As tariffs of a TSO are based on the sum of all forecasted capacity bookings, it 
is not sufficient to consider IP bookings only. The ENTSOG transparency platform 
also shows capacity at domestic points. The platform contains all capacity book-
ings levels for each TSO except exit capacity bookings to downstream distribution 
system operators, necessary to supply households. However, we may assume this 
capacity to be relatively constant over time, hence it is captured by the period fixed 
effect. Therefore, there is no need to consider these data, which are not available for 
all TSOs for the respective period.
The model in Sect. 4.1 uses forecasted values for the dummy indicating conges-
tion, the average RAB, used as a proxy for the average allowed revenues, and the 
average capacity bookings. Therefore, a decision must be made on how to forecast 
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these. We assume the best forecasted values are given by the latest actual values. 
This means that dCof
i,t
= dCoi,t−1 , CB
f
k,i,t
= CBk,i,t−1 , and RAB
f
k,i,t
= RABk,i,t−1 . For 
consistency reasons, averages are calculated for the number of TSOs in t − 1 as well. 
In the remainder we drop time indices and indicate lags by the supplement (− 1). 
Because of using lagged variables, the period of the analysis covers 2015 to 2018. 
Introducing lagged dependent variables avoids the endogeneity bias due to reverse 
causation.
During the period of observation, a market merger between Belgium and Luxem-
bourg took place. As for the data set, we ignore this merger by integrating the gas 
market area of Luxembourg in the Belgian one. After this adjustment, the data set is 
strongly balanced with borders i = 1,… , 35 and t = 2015,… , 2018 , i.e. four obser-
vations for 35 cross-sections.
Figure  2 plots the sum of the book value of the fixed assets, and capacity 
bookings for firm and interruptible capacities for all German TSOs in 2014 to 
Fig. 2  Index representation of the sum of fixed assets, firm capacity bookings and interruptible capacity 
bookings for all German TSOs in 2014 (= 100%) to 2018, source: Bundesanzeiger (2019) and ENTSOG 
(2019); own calculations
Table 1  Distribution of TSOs and congested IPs in the sample in 2014–2018 offering capacity at a bor-
der
Number of TSOs active 
at a border
All TSOs TSOs with captive 
demand
Congested IPs
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 0 0 2 1.21 134 81.21
1 72 43.64 79 47.88 18 10.91
2 52 31.52 65 39.39 10 6.06
3 35 21.21 16 9.70 3 2.82
4 6 3.64 3 1.82 0 0
Total 165 100 165 100 165 100
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2018 using an indexed representation with 2014 = 100%. The figure shows a 
positive trend for the sum of fixed assets during the period with a compound 
annual growth rate (hereafter: CAGR) of 5.45%. Firm capacity is constant over 
the period (CAGR: − 0.02%). In contrast, interruptible capacity bookings show a 
negative trend (CAGR: − 7.66%).
Table 1 shows the distributions of the total number of TSOs, the number of 
TSOs with captive demand, and the number of congested IPs. The first column 
shows the number of TSOs offering capacity at the same border. This table 
shows that most observations have only one TSO offering capacity at border 
(43.64%). However, also two TSOs (31.52%) and three TSOs (21.21%) appear 
relatively often. For the number of TSO with captive demand, the distribution 
is slightly different. 87.27% of the observations show either one TSO with cap-
tive demand (47.88%) or two (39.39%). Three TSOs with captive demand are 
observed in 9.70% of all cases. In a very few cases (1.21%), a border does not 
have any TSO with captive demand. In terms of congestions, 81.21% of all IPs 
are not congested.
A joint distribution of the total number of TSO and the number of TSOs hav-
ing captive demand (Table 2) shows that in case only one TSO offers capacity at 
a border, there are only two observations with a TSO having no captive demand. 
Additionally, there are no observations with more than one TSO, whereby at 
least one TSO has captive demand. For the empirical model, this implies that 
dCD = 1 if dS = 1 . However, if dS = 0 , dCD = 0 only in two cases. Based on 
only two observations, no reliable estimates for dCD can be expected. There-
fore, we drop the variable from the model, and assume dCD = 1 . In terms of dS , 
the dummy is 0 in approximately 44% of all observations, and 1 in about 56%. 
Hence, the data set is balanced in this respect.
To check the data set for stationarity, unit root tests may be applied. However, 
the power of these tests is low due to the sample size. Results of testing for 
cointegration are also not reliable given the length of the time series. Nonethe-
less, there is a logical relationship between tariffs, allowed revenues and capac-
ity bookings, which is the allowed revenue constraint as pointed out in Sect. 2.2. 
Therefore, we expect the variables to be cointegrated. Hence, the regressions are 
not spurious, and the fixed effects estimators are consistent.
Table 2  Joint distribution of 
TSOs with captive demand, 
and all TSOs in the sample in 
2014–2018
Total number of 
TSOs
Number of TSOs with captive demand
0 1 2 3 4 Total
1 2 70 0 0 0 72
2 0 6 46 0 0 52
3 0 0 19 16 0 35
4 0 3 0 0 3 6
Total 2 79 65 16 3 165
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4.3  Results
Table 3 shows the estimated results of the model for minimum, maximum, and 
median tariffs at borders as developed in Sect.  4.1 with the adjustments to the 
data as explained in Sect.  4.2 including cross-section fixed effects and period 
fixed effects. Tests reveal that the fixed-effects estimators are consistent.
Dummy variable dS denotes the difference between borders where more than 
on TSO offers capacity ( dS = 1 ), and those, where capacity is offered only by one 
TSO ( dS = 0) . Variable dCo(−1) is a one-period lagged dummy variable that 









 is the average RAB per TSO active at a border, and 
Table 3  Estimates for the 











standard errors in parentheses, 
cross-section fixed effects are 
not reported)
Two-tailed p values: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
dS is the dummy variable denoting the difference between borders, 
where more than on TSO offers capacity ( dS = 1 ), and those where 
capacity is offered only by one TSO ( dS = 0)
dCo(−1) is the difference between congested and non-congested bor-



















 is the average capacity bookings per TSO active at a 
border, one-period lagged
One observation is dropped from the regressions due to the condi-
tion dCD = 1, see Sect.  4.2. Considering this observation, mainly 









dS − 0.5161*** − 0.0783*** − 0.2854***
(0.0605) (0.0196) (0.0199)






























Constant 4.0201 − 1.5079 − 2.3320
(3.5598) (1.7745) (1.5744)
Period fixed effects
2016 − 0.0866 − 0.0373* − 0.0412*
(0.0624) (0.0196) (0.0217)
2017 − 0.0791 − 0.0179 − 0.0328
(0.0772) (0.0241) (0.0251)
2018 − 0.0164 0.0464 0.0143
(0.0592) (0.0352) (0.0322)
observations = 131 131 131










 stands for the average total capacity bookings per TSO active at a 
border; both use one period lagged data as a forecast as set out in Sect. 4.2.
The variable dS indicates whether a network user has a choice between different 
TSOs’ IPs at a particular border. For a revenue-cap regime with efficiency bench-
marking our theoretical assessment expects (in the short term) lower tariffs in case 
not only one but more than one TSO offers capacity at a border, i.e. dS = 1 . The 
results show that for all dependent variables, the minimum (− 51.61%), maximum 
(− 7.83%) and median tariff (− 28.54%), are significantly lower in case more than 
one TSO offers capacity at a border. Such results point at tariff adjustments made by 
TSOs as a response to the existence of substitutes to network users. This is in line 
with our hypothesis.
Forecasted congestions do not show a significant effect on tariffs in two-tail tests 
at usual levels of significance. This is not in line with our expectation.
The estimated marginal effect of the forecasted average allowed revenues is 
− 0.02% in case of the minimum tariffs, 0.23% in case of the maximum tariffs, and 
0.38% in case of the median tariffs. Whereas the estimates for the median (p < 0.01) 
and the maximum tariffs (p < 0.05) are significant, the estimates for the minimum 
tariffs are insignificant (p > 0.10).
The estimated marginal effects of the forecasted average capacity bookings 
are − 0.17%, − 0.15%, and − 0.23% (for minimum, maximum, and median tariffs, 
respectively). These estimates are significant with p < 0.01 for both maximum and 
median tariffs, and insignificant at usual levels of significance in case of minimum 
tariffs.
Comparing the results obtained with our expectations stated in Sect. 4.1, there is 
a positive coefficient related to the forecasted average allowed revenues, as expected. 
Furthermore, estimates for the forecasted average capacity bookings are negative, as 
expected. This confirms the allowed revenue constraint, except for the estimates for 
the minimum tariffs, which are not significant. Insignificant marginal effects indi-
cate that TSOs do not increase or decrease tariffs at IPs in relation to changes in 
allowed revenues or capacity bookings. This is an indication that TSOs may set the 
tariffs in response to each other.
4.4  Sensitivity analysis: test for structural differences
The main results presented in the previous section are in line with our expectations, 
which are based on the incentives for TSOs under revenue-cap regulation with an 
applied efficiency benchmarking, as explained in Sect. 3. The results point out that 
tariff adjustments are made by TSOs as a response to inter-TSO competition for vol-
umes. However, TSOs differ in their nature. TSOs may be distinguished into two 
groups. On the one hand, there are wide-ranging meshed networks to transport gas 
to industrial customers and to distribution systems to supply end customers. On the 
other hand, there are transit TSOs that operates as a kind of interconnector between 
two markets. As a sensitivity analysis, we apply the same method as in the previous 
section to two subsets. Subset 1 includes all panels with transit TSOs only, subset 2 
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includes all panels with meshed TSOs only. However, subset 1 is an empty set since 
there are no observations. For the subset of meshed TSOs we expect no differences 
with the results presented in Sect. 4.3 for the full sample, which is confirmed by our 
estimations.17 Regarding the set of meshed TSOs, minimum tariffs also appear to be 
more than 50% lower in case more than one TSO offers capacity at a border. Based 
on this, we conclude that the results presented in Sect. 4.3 are robust to structural 
differences between TSOs.
5  Conclusions
To reduce barriers to trade, and to increase wholesale market liquidity and competi-
tion, market mergers are observed in European gas markets. Such market mergers 
have taken place, for example within France and Germany, and even between coun-
tries, for example between Belgium and Luxembourg. Future mergers are expected 
not at least because regulatory authorities aim at further improving the functioning 
of wholesale markets (ACER and CEER 2015). Market mergers do not only impact 
commodity wholesale markets, but also provide network users with the choice to 
book transport capacity at different gas transmission system operators. As network 
users make efficient choices, they are sensitive to tariff differences, which implies 
that inter-TSO competition may be possible at certain borders of merged gas markets 
(Keller et al. 2019).
Our paper extends the literature on (de-)regulation of natural monopolies. How-
ever, compared to other work, like for example Cave (2004, 2014) our perspective 
is different, since potential competition arises from merging markets with regulated 
monopolies, and does not arise from unregulated new entrants in the market. Also in 
contributing to the future of tariff regulation in European gas markets our focus dif-
fers from other studies that do not take account of market mergers and their impact 
on the potential for inter-TSO competition (for example, see Cervigni et  al. 2019; 
EY and REKK 2018; Hecking 2015).
We investigate tariff related incentives for TSOs that are regulated by a revenue-
cap regime which is the most common regulatory regime applied in European gas 
markets (Economic Consulting Associates 2018). The theoretical analysis of this 
paper shows that TSOs operating under a revenue-cap regime have an incentive to 
reduce tariffs to increase allowed revenues and profits. This incentive is not based 
on capping maximum revenues but results from efficiency benchmarking. As a 
TSO’s efficiency, i.e. its productivity compared to a benchmark, impacts its allowed 
revenues and profits, the regulated firm has the incentive to increase efficiency. As 
higher capacity bookings, ceteris paribus, increase the firm’s efficiency, the TSO has 
the incentive to charge lower tariffs to obtain higher capacity bookings.
In an unmerged market, TSOs compete by reducing their costs per unit of out-
put compared to the peer group used for efficiency benchmarking. In a merged 
market, TSOs have an additional incentive as they also compete directly for the 
17 The comparison of the estimates is provided in “Appendix”.
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same demand at borders where more than one TSO offers capacity. Thus, this 
tariff related incentive is supposed to be even stronger in this situation, created 
by a market merger. Therefore, lower tariffs are expected at borders, at which 
more than one TSO offers capacity, compared to those borders, at which only 
one TSO offers capacity.
This hypothesis is tested with a panel data set of tariffs charged by German 
TSOs covering the period 2015–2018. We find that tariffs are up to 52% lower 
in situations, where capacity at border is offered by more than one TSO. This is 
in line with our hypothesis. A sensitivity analysis shows that this result is robust 
to structural differences between transit and meshed networks. For Germany, 
where TSOs operate in merged markets and under a revenue-cap regime with 
efficiency benchmarking, we conclude that TSOs have an incentive to reduce 
tariffs at network points, where they compete for demand. Our empirical analy-
sis confirms our expectations.
Our results show that inter-TSO competition under revenue-cap regulation is 
possible if an efficiency benchmarking is applied. A merger of gas markets does 
not impact the physical structure of networks and even gas flows may remain 
unaffected. Nevertheless, a market merger has an impact on inter-TSO competi-
tion since it enhances the tariff related incentives that result from applying an 
efficiency benchmarking. As regulation is deemed necessary in case of lacking 
competition, future research should investigate the consequences of such inter-
TSO competition for the regulatory framework and assess the possibility for 
changes to the regulation including potential deregulation.
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Appendix: Sensitivity analysis: testing for structural differences
To verify structural differences between transit and meshed TSOs, the empirical 
model is estimated using the full sample and the two subsets as defined in Table 4. 
The results are shown in Table 5. As there are no observations for subset 1, the table 
allows only for a comparison of the full sample and subset 2.
Table 4  Definitions and number of observations of data sets used for a subset analysis, covered period 
2015–2018
Data set Definition Observations
Full sample All borders as used in Sect. 4.3 of this paper 131
Subset 1 All borders, at which only transit TSOs offer capacity 0
Subset 2 All borders, at which only meshed TSOs offer capacity 88









 (robust standard errors in parentheses, cross-section fixed effects are not 
reported)
Two-tailed p values: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
dS is the dummy variable denoting the difference between borders, where more than on TSO offers 
capacity ( dS = 1 ), and those where capacity is offered only by one TSO ( dS = 0)



























Full sample Subset 2 Full sample Subset 2 Full sample Subset 2
dS − 0.5161*** − 0.5425*** − 0.0783*** − 0.0793** − 0.2854*** − 0.2725***
(0.0605) (0.0218) (0.0196) (0.0315) (0.0199) (0.0263)
dCo(−1) − 0.0887 − 0.1223** 0.0028 − 0.0903*** 0.0030 − 0.1264***







































constant 4.0201 − 2.8622 − 1.5079 − 1.7757* − 2.3320 − 2.2735
(3.5598) (2.4393) (1.7745) (0.9597) (1.5744) (1.3952)
Period fixed effects
2016 − 0.0866 − 0.0747** − 0.0373* − 0.0753*** − 0.0412* − 0.0676**
(0.0624) (0.0343) (0.0196) (0.0228) (0.0217) (0.0239)
2017 − 0.0791 − 0.0777** − 0.0179 − 0.0582** − 0.0328 − 0.0729***
(0.0772) (0.0285) (0.0241) (0.0267) (0.0251) (0.0245)
2018 − 0.0164 − 0.0365 0.0464 0.0153 0.0143 − 0.0173
(0.0592) (0.0377) (0.0352) (0.0357) (0.0322) (0.0315)
Observations 131 88 131 88 131 88
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